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This paper investigates the role of intangible assets as factors influencing 
participation in global value chains (GVC) in a sample of European economies. We 
distinguish between different forms of participation in GVC entailing a different 
degree of capability to create value added domestically and we examine how different 
intangible assets contribute to foster countries’ engagement in GVC and the reaping 
of benefits from such participation. The data cover 14 European countries in two 
broad sectors (manufacturing and total market services) over the period 1995-2014. 
We find that investing in intangible assets favours participation in GVC and 
contributes to value appropriation along the chain. Moreover, different intangible 
assets contribute differently to forward and backward participation [JEL 
Classification: F23, O30]. 
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1. Introduction 
International fragmentation of production, which implies that countries specialise 
in portions of the value chain and trade other portions of it, has led to widespread 
processes of globalisation of value chains (GVC) over the past two decades (for 
recent reviews, see Kaplinsky 2013; De Backer and Miroudot 2013; Timmer et al. 
2014). Baldwin (2011) has defined these as a ‘second unbundling’ of globalisation, 
which has transformed the terms of international competition and shifted the 
barycentre of the world’s global headquarters and peripheries.  
While the international fragmentation of production has allowed more countries to 
be involved in the production of a final good, not all countries have retained the same 
benefits from such process. A growing number of studies have pointed out that gains 
are unevenly distributed across the value chain (Kaplinsky 2000; Gereffi et al. 2005; 
Dedrick et al. 2010; Shin et al. 2009 and 2012; OECD 2013b). It becomes, therefore, 
crucial to assess which factors help explaining this uneven distribution.  
In this respect, some authors have observed that the economic balance of power 
often favors nodes with high technology which would imply that firms which control 
technology through mechanisms like patents or licenses are in extremely powerful 
positions and are likely to extract maximum rents from GVCs (Mudambi 2007; 
Dedrick et al. 2010). However, together with technology also better organizational 
skills and better marketing capabilities might be crucial. Overall, to extract maximum 
rents, governance becomes an important ingredient in the value chain (Gereffi et al. 
2005). Therefore, firms investing in intangible assets (research, marketing, 
organization capital, etc.) should ceteris paribus be able to generate higher returns 
with respect to other firms. 
Despite the acknowledgement of the important role of intangible assets in 
determining gains along the value chain, to our knowledge the only study looking at 
the relationship between one specific intangible asset and backward GVC 
participation is Marcolin et al. (2016). They provide evidence about the linkages 
between global value chain and organizational capital. Their analysis supports the 
assumption that industry-level investment in intangibles is causally linked to GVCs in 
the form of backward linkages with the foreign market. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a broader perspective  on these issues by 
estimating the relationship between countries’ investment in intangible assets, on the 
one hand, and some indicators of participation and value creation in GVC , on the 
other hand. In particular, we use information on countries’ stocks of intangible assets 
(R&D, marketing and advertising, design, training, organization capital) for 14 
European countries over the period 1995-2011 for manufacturing and total market 
services taken from INTAN-Invest.net. We merge intangible data with EUKLEMS 
information about value added, and hours worked and with different measures of 
participation in global value chains gathered from OECD-WTO Trade in Value 
Added (TiVA) database: domestic value added embodied in foreign exports and in 
foreign final demand (or “forward participation”); foreign value added embodied in 
domestic exports and in domestic final demand (FVADFD or “backward 
participation”). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of both the 
literature on Global value chain participation and on intangibles and growth. Section 3 
illustrates our research hypotheses while section 4 offers some descriptive evidence 
on the extent of countries’ participation in GVC and the gains from such participation. 
Section 5 focuses on the empirical strategy and the main econometric results, while 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background literature 
Two streams of literature are relevant for developing the arguments put forward in 
this paper: the recent literature on factors allowing participation in global value chains 
and the new contributions on the role of intangible assets for productivity growth. 
 
2.1 Factors affecting participation in Global Value Chain  
There is general consent that integration into GVCs brings benefits beyond those 
traditionally associated with international trade in final goods, allowing countries to 
specialize in single tasks and benefiting from economies of scale and scope. Indeed, 
empirical evidence shows that joining GVCs brings positive and significant gains in 
productivity (see, e.g. Baldwin and Yan, 2014).  
But what are the factors facilitating countries participation in GVC? To the best of 
our knowledge there are only few empirical analyses aiming at disentangling the 
determinants of countries’ capability to engage in GVC participation. These studies 
find that the level of development, infrastructure and human capital favor 
participation, while tough regulation, tariffs and other trade impediments are 
detrimental (Hummels and Schaur 2012; WTO 2014; Cheng et al. 2015; Lopez-
Gonzalez et al. 2015). 
Whilst the literature mainly agrees that participating in GVCs is largely beneficial, 
it has also been stressed that advantages are not equally divided among GVC 
participants. The classic example of the iPod supply chain discussed by Dedrick, et al. 
(2010) shows that Apple captures between one-third and one-half of an iPod’s retail 
value, Japanese firms such as Toshiba and Korean firms such as Samsung capture 
another major share while firms and workers in China capture no more than 2 percent 
from assembling the product. Overall, there is evidence that a great part of the value 
added of a final product is created in the first and last stages of the production process 
(R&D, design, marketing and sales), while firms involved in intermediate stages 
(such as the production of components and assembly) reap only a small part of the 
final value of the good or service produced (Mudambi, 2007; 2008). The pattern of 
value-added along the value chain may, therefore, be represented by the ‘smiling 
curve’ (Everatt et al., 1999) or the ‘smile of value creation’ (Mudambi, 2007): ranking 
activities on the x-axis along the value chain (activities at the left or ‘input’ end are 
supported by R&D knowledge while activities at the right or ‘output’ end are 
supported by marketing knowledge), value added will be higher in the first and last 
stages of the value chain. Given that capturing a bigger slice of the GVC pie is 
positively associated with productivity gains and higher per capita growth, an 
important under investigated issue is to disentangle the factors allowing countries not 
only to take part into GVC but also to maximize benefits from such participation.  
In this respect it can be useful to distinguish between forward linkages (where the 
country provides inputs into exports of other countries, generating domestic value-
added  which goes into  other countries'  gross exports) and  backward  linkages  
(where  the  country  imports  intermediate  products  to  be  used  in  its exports, 
leading other countries to generate foreign value added that goes into the domestic 
country gross exports).  While the share of a country in total value-added created by 
forward and backward linkages in GVCs (i.e., summing over all countries) can 
provide a measure of the extent of a country’s participation, a break-up of forward 
linkages and backward linkages in GVCs can provide  a useful insight  into the gains  
that go to a  country from its participation in GVCs (Banga, 2013). If gains are 
measured in terms of ‘net value-added’ by participation in GVCs, then higher the 
forward linkages as compared to backward linkages, higher are the gains. This  would  
imply  that  by  its  participation  in  GVCs,  a  country  is  creating  and  exporting  
more domestic value-added than  the  foreign value added which it is importing. 
Using these two measures, Banga (2013) finds that in case of US, Japan and UK, 
forward linkages are much stronger than backward linkages, indicating net value-
added gains from linking into GVCs. China and Korea, on the other hand, have 
negative net value added gains. 
 
2.2 Intangibles and productivity growth  
The changing nature of the global economy has placed a novel attention on 
intangible capital as a new source of growth. The structural and technological changes 
associated with the rapid progress in Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICT), the rising role of the service sector and the emergence of new business models 
make intangible investment a key element of global competition. The seminal paper 
by Corrado et al. (2005) is the first of a number of studies showing that intangible 
capital is an essential ingredient for economic growth.  
The literature on the sources of economic growth considers the accumulation of 
intangible capital expanding the core concept of business investment in national 
accounts by treating much business spending on “intangibles”— computerized 
databases, R&D, design, brand equity, firm-specific training, and organizational 
efficiency—as investment (e.g., see Corrado et al. 2005, 2009).  
When this view is adopted empirical evidence shows that business investments in 
intangible assets are fundamental drivers of growth and productivity. Corrado et el 
(2016) found that once intangible capital is included in a sources-of-growth analysis it 
accounts for 20-33% of labor productivity growth in the market sector of the US and 
EU economies.  
First empirical work on intangibles dates back to Nakamura (1999, 2001) who 
found that in 2000 US investment in intangibles was US$1 trillion (approximately 
equal to that in nonresidential tangible assets), with an intangible capital stock of at 
least US$5 trillion.  
Starting form Nakamura’s work, Corrado et al. (2005) developed expenditure-
based measures of a larger range of intangibles for the United States. They calculated 
that previously unmeasured intangible capital contributed 0.24 of a percentage point 
(18 per cent) to conventionally-measured Multifactor Productivity (MFP) growth in 
the United States between the mid-1990s and early 2000s. The same methodology has 
been applied in a number of other country studies — with estimates of the 
contribution of previously unmeasured intangible capital to MFP growth of 14 per 
cent (United Kingdom in Marrano et al. 2007), and 3 per cent (Finland in Jalava, et al. 
2007) over a similar period. Other country studies estimated only the contribution of 
all intangibles to MFP growth — -19 per cent in Japan (Fukao et al. 2008), 19 per 
cent in France, 18 per cent in Germany, 9 per cent in Spain and 0 per cent in Italy 
(Hao et al. 2008).  
More recently, Corrado et al. (2014) found that intangibles generate spillovers to 
the economic system thus fostering also indirectly productivity growth. 
 
3. Intangible assets and participation in Global Value Chains: research 
hypotheses  
Empirical studies have shown that export specialization in skill intensive industries 
is positively correlated with intangible intensity (OECD, 2013a). Thus the more a 
country invests in intangible assets, the more likely is to foster comparative 
advantages in international trade in such industries. In this respect, organizational 
capital has the biggest impact among the intangible assets. 
But is there a role for investment in intangible assets to affect participation in 
Global Value Chains? This will probably depend on the tasks along the value chain in 
which a country becomes specialized. Advanced countries are expected to organize 
their production along a value chain by keeping at home those activities that have a 
higher strategic value, are more complex in nature (involve higher transaction costs) 
and allow them to keep control over the value chain. Assets such as R&D 
expenditures, training, organizational capital may play a strategic role in creating 
domestic value added in these activities. Therefore, we put forward our first 
hypothesis: HP1 Advanced countries investing more in intangible assets display a 
higher participation in global value chains.  
While participation in GVC can be important in itself by allowing countries at 
different stages of development to exploit foreign demand and specialise in tasks 
along the value chain rather than having to set up entire processes of production from 
scratch (see also OECD, 2013b; Baldwin and López-Gonzalez 2015), not all forms of 
participation entail the same gains (Gereffi et al. 2005; Kaplinsky 2000; Schmitz and 
Strambach 2009).  
Overall, there is evidence that a great part of the valued added of a final product is 
created in the first and last stages of the production process, while firms involved in 
intermediate stages (such as the production of components and assembly) reap only a 
small part of the final value of the good or service produced (Mudambi, 2007; 2008). 
This pattern of value-added creation along the value chain has been represented by the 
‘smiling curve’ (Everatt et al., 1999) or the ‘smile of value creation’ (Mudambi, 
2008).  
We argue that, although this might not necessarily be true in all countries (e.g. in 
many resource intensive countries upstream activities can consist in providing raw 
materials in the value chain), in Europe activities at both ends of the value chain are 
intensive in their application of knowledge and creativity, which are strictly linked to 
investing in intangible assets. Moreover, generally, the allocation of value created in a 
GVC varies according to the ability of participants to supply sophisticated products or 
services. The supply of these products or services critically depends on intangible 
assets such as R&D, brands, organizational structure. Therefore we introduce our 
second hypothesis: HP2 Benefits from participation in GVC (in terms of value added 
creation) increase with investment in intangible assets in advanced economies. 
Finally, the role of intangible assets might differ according to the position of a 
country in the GVC. While assets such as R&D and design may be strategic in the 
upstream activities stages of the value chains, other assets such as marketing and 
advertising may be more important in downstream activities. Following Koopman et 
al. (2010), total GVC participation can be decomposed in foreign value added 
embodied in one country’s exports and the value of exports of intermediates in value 
added exports of other countries. The former indicates the extent to which a country’s 
exports are dependent on imported content, the so-called backward integration. It is 
therefore likely to be higher if a country (or sector) is involved in downstream 
production. Conversely, the second measure is likely to be higher for countries (and 
sectors) involved in upstream production, with output and exports of that country 
feeding into the production and exports of downstream producers (i.e. forward 
integration). The analysis of backward and forward integration can provide hints on 
where within a GVC a particular country is. We, therefore, put forward our third 
hypothesis: HP3 intangible assets provide a different contribution to forward and 
backward participation in GVC. R&D, and design contribute more to forward 
linkages while marketing and advertising more to backward linkages. 
  
4. Descriptive evidence: intangible capital and GVC participation 
In advanced countries, higher levels of intangible investment are associated with 
higher rates of productivity growth. Empirical evidence shows that many EU 
countries are experiencing a shift from tangible to intangible investment, particularly 
in areas where they have greatest comparative advantages. The driving factors of the 
relatively faster accumulation of intangible capital are related to the shift from 
industry to services, the rise of the digital economy, the changing global 
specialization in production, and general technological progress (OECD, 2015). 
Our goal is to investigate to what extent the growing relevance of intangible capital 
affects the degree and the benefits of countries’ participation to global value chains. 
Thus we start our analysis providing an overview of the diffusion of intangible capital 
accumulation and the level of participation to GVC across the EU countries. 
Figure 1 shows that intangibles account for a relatively higher share of value added 
in services (8.2%) than in manufacturing (7.0%) in six out of eleven countries. 
Services are significantly more intangible intensive than manufacturing in UK, 
Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium while in Austria and Spain the two sectors show 
relatively comparable shares.  
         FIG.1 
INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT 1995-2010: AVERAGE VALUE ADDED SHARE 
 
 
Source:INTAN Invest (www.INTAN-Invest.net) 
 
Participation in global value chains (standardized by hours worked) is rather 
heterogeneous across countries with higher indexes for manufacturing compared to 
services (Figure 2). Nordic and Continental EU economies (with the exception of 
Belgium and Finland) show relatively higher degree of participation compared to the 
Mediterranean countries.  
However, the index of participation is not informative about the position of a 
country along the supply chain. To identify if a country is specializing in activities 
upstream or downstream in the production network we need to look at its forward and 
backward linkages in GVC.  
                                                                                                                                         FIG. 2 
PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: TIVA OECD Database 
 
Figures 3 and 4 provide evidence on the extent of forward and backward 
participation in the EU sample economies. In 2010, Denmark, Sweden and the 
Netherlands have higher forward than backward participation in manufacturing 
suggesting they lie relatively more upstream in the production network. Germany is 
instead more involved in downstream production as supported by a higher backward 
than forward participation index, while France has comparable values for both 
forward and backward participation.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          FIG. 3 
FORWARD PARTICIPATION TO GVC 
 
                                                                                                                                                            FIG. 4 
BACKWARD PARTICIPATION 
 Gains from participation refer to the capability of a country to appropriate a large 
share of value added. In 2011, UK and Netherlands have relatively higher gains both 
in manufacturing and services, Denmark higher in manufacturing and Germany in 
services (Figure5).  
                                                                                                                                                         FIG. 5  
GAINS FROM PARTICIPATION  
Higher participation in GVC is not necessarily linked to higher gains. In our 
sample this is the case of Sweden and Austria showing very high participation but 
relatively low gains. The Netherlands instead has both high participation and high 
gains implying that it is creating and exporting more domestic value added than how 
much it is importing foreign value added. The Mediterranean countries have both low 
participation and gains from GVC. 
 
5. Intangible capital and GVC 
5.1 Exploring the correlation between intangible capital and GVC participation 
and benefits 
The main goal of our analysis is to investigate if and to what extent intangible 
capital accumulation is related to the degree and the benefits of country’s 
participation in GVC. Thus this section provides an overview of the correlations 
between different measures of participation in GVC and intangible assets. 
Figure 6 shows data on per hour worked total intangible capital against 
participation in GVC in manufacturing and services across the sample countries. 
Correlation is significantly positive in both sectors suggesting a deeper analysis is 
warranted. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      FIG. 6 
PARTICIPATION TO GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS VS INTANGIBLE CAPITAL  
 
Figures 7 and 8 show forward and backward measures of GCV participation 
plotted against four different types of intangibles: R&D, Training, Advertising and 
Organizational capital. The linkages with R&D is rather strong for both indicators 
while for the remaining assets the correlation is relatively stronger with forward than 
with backward linkages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                             FIG. 7 
FORWARD PARTICIPATION TO GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       FIG. 8 
BACKWARD PARTICIPATION TO GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS  
 
Finally, Figure 9 provides evidence of the correlation between gains from 
participation in GVC and per hour total intangible capital in manufacturing and 
services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       FIG. 9  
GAINS FROM PARTICIPATION TO GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND INTANGIBLE CAPITAL  
 Gains from participation are positively correlated with intangible capital 
accumulation with services showing a more widespread distribution across countries. 
 
5.2 Empirical strategy  
We start by exploring the relationship between the participation in GVC and 
intangible capital accumulation testing the relevance of intangible assets as drivers of 
forward and backward participation in GVC.  
 
lnYi,c,t
GVCj =α1 lnKi,c,t
Intgs +α2 lnKi,c,tICT +α3 lnKi,c,t
Non ICT 
+α4 lnXi,c,t +δt +γi 
+εc,i,t  
 
where:  
 
c=country (14 EU member countries), i=industry (manufacturing and business 
services), and t time (1995, 2000, 2005, 2008-2011). Y GVCj represents different 
indicators for GVC participation (total, forward and backward) and gains from GVC 
measured as the ratio between forward and backward indicators. KIntgs is intangible 
capital with s=Total Intangible, R&D, Training, Design, Advertising and marketing, 
Organizational capital; KICT is ICT capital and KNon ICT is tangible Non ICT capital 
stock; X are other controls (corporate income taxes, country size); δt and γi are time 
and industry dummies. All variables are in per hour term.  
We use an export-based indicator to measure participation in GVC that can be split 
into backward and forward participation.  
In particular, domestic value added embodied in foreign exports (DVAFEX) 
captures the domestic value added content of gross exports and includes the value 
added generated by the exporting industry during its production processes as well as 
any value added coming from upstream domestic suppliers that is embodied in the 
exports. This measure is likely to be higher for countries (and sectors) involved in 
upstream production, with output and exports of that country feeding into the 
production and exports of downstream producers (i.e. forward integration).  
Foreign value added content of gross exports (FVADEX) captures the value of 
imported intermediate goods and services that are embodied in a domestic industry’s 
exports. The value added can come from any foreign industry upstream in the 
production chain. It is used to measure the extent to which a country’s exports are 
dependent on imported content, the so-called backward integration. It is therefore 
likely to be higher if a country (or sector) is involved in downstream production.  
Finally the sum of the two indicators is a measure of overall participation in GCV. 
Therefore HP1 requires the coefficient of Kint to be positive and significant when the 
dependent variable is the sum of DVAFEX and FVADEX, while HP3 requires a 
different impact of investment in R&D, design, marketing and advertising on the two 
indicators (for R&D and design higher for DVAFEX and for marketing and 
advertising higher for FVADEX). 
Domestic value added embodied in foreign final demand (DVAFFD) measures the 
contribution in terms of value added to the final demand of foreign countries 
including their consumption and gross fixed capital formation together with their 
exports.  
Foreign value added embodied in domestic final demand (FVADFD) measures 
how much foreign countries contribute in terms of value added to the final demand of 
the domestic country. Therefore, the ratio between DVAFFD and FVADFD and the 
ratio between DVAFEX and FVADEX are used as indicators of the capability of a 
country to appropriate a large share of value added. Therefore HP3 requires Kint to 
positively affect these ratios. 
 
 6. Econometric results 
We first estimate the determinants of participation in GVC (Table 1), then assess 
how different intangible assets affect forward and backward participation (Tables 2 
and 3) and finally look at the relationship between intangible assets and gains for 
participation (Tables 4 and 5). In all estimations we report results for total intangible 
assets (column 1) and distinguishing between R&D and other intangible assets 
(columns 2, 3 and 4). Finally, we consider separately training (column 5), marketing 
and advertising (column 6), architectural design (column 7) and organizational capital 
(column 8).  
Looking at table 1, we find support for our first hypothesis: total intangible assets 
positively affect participation in global value chains. This confirms the important role 
played by this type of investment for advanced countries. Moreover, when looking 
separately at R&D and other intangible assets, they both show up with a positive and 
significant coefficients, with other assets playing a larger role with respect to R&D. 
Finally, all assets but architectural design contribute to explaining participation in 
GVCs and the larger impact is associated to investment in training.  
The results also show that tangible capital and ICT positively contribute to 
participation in GVCs pointing to the complementary role of tangible capital, 
intangible capital and ICT for countries and industries to take part to the global 
production process. However, while tangible assets have a positive impact on GVC 
participation across all specifications, ICT loses significance in some specifications. 
This can be due to some collinearity between ICT capital and investment in some 
intangible assets. Finally as expected small countries and countries with a lower 
income corporate tax rate enjoy higher participation in GVCs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    TAB. 1  
THE DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
  
 
When looking separately at forward and backward participation (Table 2 and 3), 
we find partial support for our third hypothesis. Most intangible assets appear to 
contribute positively to both forward and backward participation; however, the impact 
of R&D is larger for forward than for backward participation (coefficients are 
respectively 0.38 and 0.12) while that of marketing and advertising is larger for 
backward linkages (coefficients are respectively 0.14 and 0.40). This is consistent 
with R&D being more important in upstream production and marketing and 
advertising in downstream production. However, contrary to our hypothesis, in the 
case of architectural design the results show no significant impact on forward 
participation. Finally, training and organizational capital (for which we had no a priori 
hypotheses) appear to be more important for forward participation. In particular, 
while training positively affects both forward and backward participation, 
organizational capital has a negative effect on backward participation. This is an 
interesting result deserving more investigation.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES xtgls
lnH_D_totintg 0.169***
(0.050)
lnH_D_intg_xrd_kstock 0.346*** 0.397***
(0.067) (0.120)
lnH_D_rd_kstock_k 0.247*** 0.143***
(0.035) (0.047)
lnH_D_train_kstock_k 0.596***
(0.049)
lnH_D_adv_mkt_kstock_k 0.306***
(0.069)
lnH_D_arch_des_kstock_k 0.015
(0.063)
lnH_D_orgcap_kstock_k 0.250***
(0.045)
lnH_D_k_ict 0.316*** 0.262*** 0.173** 0.025 0.103 0.199** 0.495*** 0.160**
(0.080) (0.058) (0.084) (0.091) (0.065) (0.091) (0.077) (0.081)
lnH_D_all_tang_kstock_k 0.447*** 0.406*** 0.421*** 0.355*** 0.098** 0.412*** 0.359*** 0.539***
(0.065) (0.058) (0.055) (0.062) (0.047) (0.057) (0.061) (0.064)
ln_pop -0.148*** -0.124*** -0.223*** -0.230*** -0.283*** -0.197*** -0.103 -0.140***
(0.049) (0.046) (0.052) (0.051) (0.036) (0.058) (0.070) (0.051)
corporateincometaxrate -0.028*** -0.019*** -0.028*** -0.014*** -0.010** -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.030***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 92 82 92 82 92 92 92 92
Number of ctrysec 18 16 18 16 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
((DVAFEX+FVAFEX)/H)
As far as other assets are concerned, ICT appears to be more important for 
backward participation while tangible capital for forward participation. High 
corporate income taxes discourage both forward and backward participation and the 
size of the country is negatively association to both types of participation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                           TAB. 2 
THE DETERMINANTS OF FORWARD PARTICIPATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES xtgls
lnH_D_totintg 0.301***
(0.060)
lnH_D_intg_xrd_kstock 0.503*** 0.540***
(0.083) (0.116)
lnH_D_rd_kstock_k 0.385*** 0.251***
(0.040) (0.051)
lnH_D_train_kstock_k 0.787***
(0.048)
lnH_D_adv_mkt_kstock_k 0.141*
(0.076)
lnH_D_arch_des_kstock_k -0.001
(0.051)
lnH_D_orgcap_kstock_k 0.124**
(0.057)
lnH_D_k_ict 0.160** 0.108* 0.005 -0.206** -0.137*** 0.277*** 0.419*** -0.177**
(0.074) (0.063) (0.089) (0.093) (0.051) (0.092) (0.051) (0.076)
lnH_D_all_tang_kstock_k 0.553*** 0.513*** 0.505*** 0.441*** 0.213*** 0.518*** 0.479*** 0.075
(0.069) (0.067) (0.071) (0.071) (0.040) (0.059) (0.050) (0.059)
ln_pop -0.222*** -0.250*** -0.236*** -0.285*** -0.272*** -0.130* -0.064 -0.248***
(0.042) (0.034) (0.049) (0.052) (0.035) (0.067) (0.070) (0.039)
corporateincometaxrate -0.032*** -0.015** -0.034*** -0.016** -0.012** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.025***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 92 82 92 82 92 92 92 92
Number of ctrysec 18 16 18 16 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(lnH_dvafex)
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 TAB. 3 
THE DETERMINANTS OF BACKWARD PARTICIPATION 
 
While intangible assets appear to matter for European countries to take part in 
global value chains, we may ask whether they also contribute to the appropriation of a 
great share of value added created in a GVC. We expect that since value appropriation 
varies according to the ability of participants to supply sophisticated products or 
services, countries investing more in intangible assets have a comparative advantage 
in producing such products or services. Tables 4 and 5 report estimates of the gains 
from participation. In Table 4 these are measured as the ratio between domestic value 
added embodied in foreign exports and foreign value added embodied in domestic 
exports. The idea is that the higher is domestic value added to foreign value added, 
the higher is the domestic appropriation of value along the value chain. In table 5, a 
similar indicator is built considering the ratio between domestic value added 
embodied in foreign final demand and foreign value added embodied in domestic 
final demand. This second indicator considers not only value added embodied in 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES xtgls
lnH_D_totintg 0.144***
(0.046)
lnH_D_intg_xrd_kstock 0.281*** 0.277*
(0.088) (0.152)
lnH_D_rd_kstock_k 0.119*** 0.036
(0.041) (0.064)
lnH_D_train_kstock_k 0.415***
(0.063)
lnH_D_adv_mkt_kstock_k 0.404***
(0.074)
lnH_D_arch_des_kstock_k 0.158**
(0.074)
lnH_D_orgcap_kstock_k -0.203***
(0.050)
lnH_D_k_ict 0.385*** 0.399*** 0.299*** 0.254** 0.255*** 0.178* 0.413*** 0.278***
(0.084) (0.070) (0.100) (0.110) (0.088) (0.099) (0.087) (0.077)
lnH_D_all_tang_kstock_k 0.325*** 0.319*** 0.256*** 0.264*** 0.084 0.265*** 0.262*** -0.224***
(0.069) (0.066) (0.068) (0.073) (0.063) (0.065) (0.070) (0.059)
ln_pop -0.158** -0.158** -0.187** -0.234*** -0.335*** -0.225*** -0.162* -0.293***
(0.075) (0.074) (0.078) (0.078) (0.063) (0.060) (0.084) (0.076)
corporateincometaxrate -0.027*** -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.010 -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.028***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 92 82 92 82 92 92 92 92
Number of ctrysec 18 16 18 16 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(lnH_fvadex)
exports but also that embodied in consumption and investment giving a broader 
picture of overall value creation. 
Looking at the results of gains from participation measured referring to exports 
(Table 4), we find that intangible assets positively affect value appropriation and the 
results are robust to introducing separately R&D and other intangible assets. 
However, not all intangible assets have the same importance: training and 
organizational capital have a large positive effect while marketing and advertising and 
architectural design do not appear to matter. The big role of organizational capital in 
affecting value appropriation in GVC confirms the importance of governance for 
extracting maximum rents also for advanced countries. More difficult to interpret is 
the negative impact of ICT on gains from participation in most specifications. 
Although this might depend on some degree of collinearity with intangible assets (in 
the specification where only architectural design is included ICT shows up positive 
and significant), it could also be linked to the higher importance of ICT for 
downstream with respect to upstream production. Finally, tangible capital, population 
and the corporate income tax rate do not appear to affect gains from participation.  
When looking at value appropriation in terms of final demand, results are only 
partly confirmed. Intangible assets positively affect value appropriation, although 
with a lower coefficient. Moreover, when R&D and other intangible assets are 
introduced simultaneously in the regression, only R&D has a significant impact. 
Another important difference is that organizational capital is no longer significant. 
Finally, tangible capital and the corporate income tax rate negatively affect gains from 
participation and larger countries appear to appropriate a larger share of value added 
compared to smaller ones.    
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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE DOMESTIC TO FOREIGN VALUE ADDED CONTENT OF 
EXPORTS  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES xtgls
lnH_D_totintg 0.285***
(0.056)
lnH_D_intg_xrd_kstock 0.450*** 0.221*
(0.071) (0.116)
lnH_D_rd_kstock_k 0.152*** 0.095**
(0.025) (0.043)
lnH_D_train_kstock_k 0.331***
(0.049)
lnH_D_adv_mkt_kstock_k -0.102
(0.080)
lnH_D_arch_des_kstock_k 0.042
(0.064)
lnH_D_orgcap_kstock_k 0.297***
(0.038)
lnH_D_k_ict -0.204*** -0.083** -0.307*** -0.218*** -0.254*** 0.152* 0.039 -0.254***
(0.076) (0.042) (0.083) (0.078) (0.068) (0.078) (0.069) (0.077)
lnH_D_all_tang_kstock_k 0.048 0.014 -0.035 -0.024 -0.021 0.031 0.011 0.076
(0.059) (0.046) (0.056) (0.051) (0.050) (0.055) (0.057) (0.061)
ln_pop 0.053 0.017 0.077 0.042 0.030 0.115* 0.091 0.048
(0.057) (0.059) (0.060) (0.065) (0.055) (0.063) (0.065) (0.051)
corporateincometaxrate -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.007 -0.005 -0.005 0.003
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 92 82 92 82 92 92 92 92
Number of ctrysec 18 16 18 16 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
((DVAFEX/FVAFEX))
  
TAB. 5 THE DETERMINANTS OF THE DOMESTIC TO FOREIGN VALUE ADDED CONTENT 
OF FINAL DEMAND 
 
 
7. Conclusions  
A recent stream of literature has emphasized the importance of intangible assets, 
including R&D but also organizational capital, training, marketing and advertising for 
firms’ and countries’ productivity growth. At the same time a growing field of 
research has highlighted how the globalization of value chains has changed the 
traditional factors of international competitiveness with different benefits accruing to 
different firms and countries depending on the tasks performed within the value chain. 
This paper is a first attempt at bridging the two streams of literature by investigating 
whether and how intangible assets contribute to foster advanced countries’ 
participation in global value chains. The main results of this analysis can be 
summarized as follows. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES xtgls
lnH_D_totintg 0.044*
(0.026)
lnH_D_intg_xrd_kstock 0.027 0.014
(0.035) (0.063)
lnH_D_rd_kstock_k 0.080*** 0.077***
(0.023) (0.026)
lnH_D_train_kstock_k 0.056*
(0.030)
lnH_D_adv_mkt_kstock_k 0.027
(0.038)
lnH_D_arch_des_kstock_k 0.054*
(0.032)
lnH_D_orgcap_kstock_k 0.033
(0.021)
lnH_D_k_ict 0.046 -0.013 0.055 -0.022 0.012 0.061 0.042 0.051
(0.042) (0.046) (0.045) (0.060) (0.049) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043)
lnH_D_all_tang_kstock_k -0.119** -0.069 -0.123** -0.071 -0.109** -0.131** -0.134*** -0.120**
(0.051) (0.058) (0.052) (0.060) (0.046) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
ln_pop -0.062*** -0.079*** -0.062*** -0.079*** -0.072*** -0.054** -0.056*** -0.064***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021)
corporateincometaxrate -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 92 82 92 82 92 92 92 92
Number of ctrysec 18 16 18 16 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
((DVAFFD/FVADFD))
First, intangible capital as a whole is positively related to participation in global 
value chains in advanced countries. Moreover non-R&D intangibles play a larger role 
than R&D, with training being the main driver of participation.  
Secondly, intangibles contribute positively, but to a different extent, to both 
forward and backward participation: R&D is more relevant for forward linkages while 
marketing and advertising are more important for backward linkages. This evidence 
supports the assumption that R&D is a factor affecting upstream production while 
marketing and advertising have a role in downstream production.  
Finally, intangibles positively affect value appropriation along the value chain 
(measured as the domestic value added embodied in foreign exports relative to the 
foreign value added embodied in domestic exports) and the results are robust to 
introducing separately R&D and other intangible assets. Training and organizational 
capital have a large positive effect on value appropriation while marketing and 
advertising and architectural design do not.  
The descriptive evidence reported in the paper has also shown the heterogeneous 
behavior of European countries in terms of both intangible capital accumulation and 
participation in global value chains. In this respect the low figures for Mediterranean 
countries (Italy and Spain) suggest that these countries are in a vicious circle of low 
investment in high value added creating activities and low competitiveness in 
international markets.  
Although the paper does not address this issue directly, the poor performance in 
productivity and growth of the Italian economy could be partly due to the joint effect 
of underinvestment in intangible assets and relatively low intensity of firm 
participation in GVCs. Therefore, higher levels of public investment in intangible 
assets and fiscal and innovation policies promoting private investment are highly 
needed to enhance competitiveness and growth.  
Due to the short time series, this paper has not tested the possible two way 
relationship between investment in intangible assets and participation in GVC. This is 
left for future studies that could also address their joint impact on sectoral/national 
productivity. 
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